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Composition of small and large firms' business networkS 
in transition economies  
 
ABSTRACT 
Recent research has theorized on the composition of firms' business 
networks but has not empirically examined business networks in transition 
economies may vary for different firms. In this study, using firm level data 
from twenty six transition economies collected by the World Bank and the 
EBRD in 1999-2000, we conduct a set of logistic regression models to 
investigate the composition of small and large firms' business networks. The 
results show that, in contrast to smaller firms, larger firms are more likely 
to have formal business relationships, and relationships with national and 
foreign financial institutions, government, and foreign firms. In addition, in 
a subgroup analysis of seven transition economies we show that the 
composition of the firms' business networks varies substantially across 
countries but that the government is still a dominant client. Furthermore, 
we found a large variation on firms' reliance on informal ties and the extent 
to which firms exchange with foreign firms.  
 
Keywords: business relationships, multi-country, transition economies, 
institutional environment 
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INTRODUCTION 
The composition of small and large firms' business networks is likely 
to vary substantially. While some scholars have suggested that firms' 
business networks evolve over their life cycles in response to strategies and 
circumstances (Human & Provan, 2000; Hite & Hesterly, 2001), few studies 
have attempted to test empirically how similar or different are the networks 
of firms of different sizes, and whether in fact there is any difference. 
However, it is likely that the composition, structure, configuration, and 
stability of firms' business networks are idiosyncratic to the firms' needs 
(Gulati et al., 2000; Hite & Hesterly, 2001). For example, network ties are 
particularly important for small and/or young firms whose legitimacy and 
reputation are not yet established (Saxenian, 1990; Stuart et al., 1999; 
Human & Provan, 2000). Firms integrated in business networks seem to 
have easier access to various types of resources (Lipparini & Sobrero, 1994) 
and information (Dyer & Singh, 1998) that improves their chances to detect 
new market and innovation opportunities (Birley, 1985; Walker et al., 1997; 
Gulati, 1998; Hite & Hesterly, 2001) and gain reputation and social 
endorsement (Stuart et al., 1999).  
Previous research has suggested that there are significant differences 
in terms of organizational structure, market focus, strategy, and resource 
endowments between small and large firms (e.g., Stinchcombe, 1965; 
Mintzberg, 1979). For example, small and young firms are highly dependent 
on their personal and cohesive social relationships (Hite & Hesterly, 2001) 
such as their relationships with family members or friends on which they 
rely to obtain resources, gain legitimacy (Lipparini & Sobrero, 1994; Human 
& Provan, 2000), and to overcome possible disadvantages of newness and 
smallness (Stinchcombe, 1965). Conversely, larger firms may seek business 
relationships for different strategic motives (Hite & Hesterly, 2001) such as 
innovation, market access, financial needs, and so forth. Thus, differences 
in the business relationships of small and large firms are likely to be 
determined by both resource needs and by strategic motives. To some 
extent, the composition of the firms' network is the result of a planned 
strategy (Baum et al.,  2000) and of a rational and 'calculative' process 
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(Hite & Hesterly, 2001). However, the environment in which firms operate 
also influence both firms' resource deficiencies and strategies as well as 
their ability to configure their networks. Hence, understanding how the 
composition of firms' business networks may differ for small and large firms 
offers insight into why firms may seek to modify their business networks. In 
addition, examining how this occurs in transition economies offers insight 
into the influence of the economic and institutional environment on firms' 
ability to establish business ties.  
Firms in transition economies may need to rely more on their ability 
to form ties to other firms than firms in developed countries. Transition 
economies present an interesting context for studying business networks 
because, in this context, networks may not only be essential for firms' 
survival but they may also facilitate firms' adjustment to a business 
environment that is changing continuously. In this condition we may expect 
reputation and legitimacy to be a stronger referral than we probably 
consider in more institutionally developed countries. Furthermore, the lack 
of effective and efficient institutions in transition economies may require 
inter-firms forms of collaboration to overcome resource limitations in such 
an extensive manner that is not a primary concern for firms in institutionally 
developed countries. For example, Roth and Kostova (2001) noted that 
firms in transition economies tend to substitute formal business 
relationships by informal relationships. Notwithstanding, extant research 
has focused essentially on developed countries, primarily on the U.S. 
(Saxenian, 1994; Human & Provan, 2000) and Europe (e.g., Piore & Sabel's 
(1984) work on the industrial districts in Europe). Consequently, while it 
seems reasonable that the configuration of firms' business network may 
differ in transition countries from that most likely to be observed in more 
institutionally and economically developed western countries, empirically, 
we know very little about whether and how the composition of firms' 
business network may differ in other economic environments, namely in 
transition economies. 
In this study, we contrast the networks of small and large firms in 
transition economies. This study contributes to our understanding of firms' 
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networks in transition economies as a facilitating mechanism for firms' 
ability to ride through the transition period. This study further permits us to 
draw some dissimilarities among transition countries evidencing that more 
fine grained examinations, in contrast to studies that group all transition 
countries together, are required to understand contextual factors as well as 
firms' characteristics that influence the composition of firms' networks. 
Specifically, on a sample of firms from twenty six transition economies, we 
empirically test whether the composition of firms' business network varies 
for small and large firms. The remaining of this study is structured in three 
main sections. The first section entails a brief literature review with the 
development of hypotheses, anchored in the idea that firms rely on their 
business networks where the composition of these networks differs 
significantly depending on firms' size and country of origin. The second 
section develops the empirical method and includes the description of the 
data, variables, and results. The third section comprises a discussion of the 
results, implications, and avenues for future research.  
 
FIRMS' BUSINESS NETWORKS 
The composition of a firm's business network refers to the types of 
organizations or the portfolio of members that are included in the 
organization's business network (Baum et al., 2000; Gulati et al., 2000). 
Following Hite and Hesterly (2001) we restrict our analysis to the firm's ego 
network, and to the actors directly connected with a focal firm. Therefore, 
we focus on network composition in terms of the partners with which each 
focal firm has direct business relationships.  
Small firms have, per definition, a limited pool of managerial, 
financial, informational, and human resources (Stinchcombe, 1965; 
Beamish, 1999). Therefore, small firms may need to rely more on their 
business networks to overcome resource and informational constraints to 
improve their likelihood of survival and success (Birley, 1985; Jack & 
Anderson, 2002). For example, Fontes and Coombs (1997) observed that 
business relationships are often aimed at accessing complementary 
activities or at compensating for deficiencies. Business relationships also 
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expose firms to information and other resources not yet held, hence, 
providing growth opportunities.  
Partnering with other organizations may be an effective way to 
minimize transaction costs, increase market power, promote learning, share 
risk (Larson, 1992; Gulati et al., 2000; Lu & Beamish, 2001), obtain 
endorsement (Stuart et al., 1999), and favor the access to an array of 
physical and intangible resources. We will review some arguments for why a 
firm enters a network in the following section but it is worth noting outright 
that, in this study, we build on Hite and Hesterly's (2001) conceptual idea 
that firms' membership in a network of business relationships may not only 
be a resource dependence necessity but also a strategy. Firms engage in 
business relationships not only to overcome current resource limitations but 
also to realize strategic objectives such as survival, growth, or market 
entry. If this is the case, not only we could expect to observe firms of 
different sizes engaging in dissimilar network arrangements, but we may 
also expect that the business environment of the firm (i.e., the institutional 
environment) will lead firms to seek different portfolios of relationships.  
Formalization of business ties  
The business networks of small firms are likely to be predominantly 
composed of informal and path dependent business relationships. Informal 
relationships are frequently the owners' personal relationships (Dubini & 
Aldrich, 1991; Hite & Hesterly, 2001) and refer to personal and generally 
non-contractual relationships (Macaulay, 1963; Granovetter, 1985) such as 
family ties (Larson, 1992), friendship relationships (Peng & Luo, 2000), 
affiliation connections (Macaulay, 1963), and community bonds 
(Galaskiewicz, 1979). Small firms frequently lack influence, endorsement, 
perception of quality, reliability, reputation, and legitimacy (Boeker, 1989; 
Larson, 1992). As a result, other organizations may hesitate to form formal 
relationships with small firms (Stuart et al., 1999). Ferreira (2002) 
suggested a parenting model whereby new, and possibly small, firms tend 
to exploit existing informal relationships with their parent firms instead of 
exploring new relationships with firms outside the parental network of 
relationships. In sum, the firms' informal network of business relationships 
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are an important vehicle for information, reputation, advice, referral, 
market selection, market entry facilitation, and commercial expansion 
(Oviatt & McDougall, 1995; Jack & Anderson, 2002) particularly for small 
firms.  
In contrast to small firms, large firms are more likely to rely on 
formal business relationships. Although informal relationships may provide 
sufficient resources when firms are small, firms' growth often requires 
additional resources not met by existing informal relationships. For 
example, large firms may need to seek financial institutions with the 
capacity to meet larger financial capital requirements. Alternatively, large 
firms may seek financing in capital markets going public, which bears 
significant monitoring by external agents, institutional investors, and 
financial regulation institutions (Aggarwal & Rivoli, 1991) that are generally 
outside the possibilities of small firms. Therefore, as small firms grow to 
become larger corporations it is reasonable to assume that more formal 
exchange governance mechanisms, possibly governed by contracts, will 
gain predominance. These may be business relationships with local and 
national governments, with major clients and suppliers, with foreign firms, 
and with financial service firms both domestic and foreign. In other words, 
large firms are likely to be perceived as having higher reputation and stable 
operations, which facilitates establishing formal ties with other firms. 
Moreover, prior relationships with other large and prestigious firms increase 
the likelihood of forming subsequent additional formal relationships (Gulati, 
1995) due to acquired legitimacy and reputation (Human & Provan, 2000). 
To conclude, large firms have accumulated experience, resources, and prior 
relationships, which downplay the importance of, and dependence on, 
informal business relationships. Thus, large firms are more likely to have a 
larger pool of formal, as opposed to informal, business relationships with 
other agents than small firms. 
In transition economies, the transaction costs are generally higher 
than in institutionally developed countries (Meyer, 2001) and these 
transaction costs are likely to be higher for exchanges with small firms than 
with large firms. To engage in business relationships with small firms a focal 
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firm is subject to higher uncertainty and needs to gather additional 
information, which is often not available. While external signals may provide 
some referral, such as small firms' membership in trade and industry 
associations, these are imperfect sources. Thus, the focal firm is likely to 
prefer exchanging via formal and contractual arrangements that provide at 
least some degree of stability to the exchange and decreases the likelihood 
of opportunistic behaviors even in the presence of ineffective regulatory 
institutions. 
Hypothesis 1: Large firms are more likely to have formal, as opposed to 
informal, business relationships in their business network than small firms.  
Business relationships with financial firms  
As firms grow, their financial demands increase and the inability of the 
personal ties to pool together the financial resources required may 
determine the need to seek financial institutions. Small firms will find it 
difficult to attract financial resources from external sources due to high 
perceived risk (Singh et al., 1986; Baum & Oliver, 1991) and prohibitive 
costs of public offerings (Aggarwal & Rivoli, 1991). However, as the focal 
firms grow and become established in the market, accumulate experience, 
build a track record of success, increase internal formalization, and adopt 
transparent internal decision-making processes, their credit ratings are likely 
to improve and attract financial service firms' interest. Therefore, larger 
firms are likely to 'calculatively' (Hite & Hesterly, 2001) establish ties to co-
opt financial service firms and alleviate financial resource dependence 
(Rowley et al., 2000) that informal ties cannot overcome. Financial service 
firms such as banks or leasing are also more likely to get involved with 
larger and established firms than with smaller firms due to lower transaction 
costs incurred.  
In transition economies, the capital market and the financial 
institutions are generally underdeveloped, ineffective, and inefficient 
(Perotti, 1993; Newman, 2000). To overcome this limitation, firms may 
resort to informal sources of capital (Newman, 2000). Alternatively, firms 
may seek foreign financial service firms. Most local (national or regional) 
banks in transition economies continue to be largely state owned and tend to 
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sustain loans to non-performing and over-indebted state-owned firms 
(Perotti, 1993; Stiglitz, 1994), less often extending loans to private 
enterprises (Stiglitz, 1994; Jelic et al., 1999). Technologically obsolete local 
banks are unable to evaluate the viability of private or privatized firms 
especially when these firms are small. 
Hypothesis 2.1. Large firms are more likely to have business relationships 
to local financial service firms in their business network than small firms. 
Foreign financial service firms are also important sources of financial 
capital for firms. Foreign banks are particularly important given the 
shortage of liquidity by local banks in transition economies (Stiglitz, 1994). 
Foreign financial service firms are unlikely to finance the operations and/or 
investments of small firms except in limited and specific situations of a 
provable track record of, for example, innovative performance. However, 
the majority of the small firms do not have the reputation and legitimacy 
nor the track record of accomplishments needed, which heightens foreign 
financial firms' uncertainty. Furthermore, the transaction costs of lending to 
small firms increase in the form of uncertainty and information needs simply 
because it is more difficult to obtain independent and reliable data on small 
firms than on large firms, particularly on large public firms. An inefficient 
pool of regulatory institutions heightens these risks and costs. Hence, it is 
more likely that foreign financial service firms will engage in business 
transactions with large and legitimized firms rather than with small firms. 
An alternative explanation relies on the search capabilities of firms. 
In comparison to large firms, small firms may rely more on cohesive 
informal relationships (i.e., relationships to friends or acquaintanceships) 
because their search capabilities are limited to the neighboring landscape 
and are less likely to be aware of the full range of financing possibilities 
(Hite & Hesterly, 2001). This may signify that small firms do not search for 
financing opportunities outside their local (regional or national) areas. 
Therefore, these small firms may be unaware of the possibilities or the 
procedures to obtain foreign financing. Conversely, large firms possess 
more resources, broader search capabilities, and more knowledge on 
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various mechanisms, namely on the processes required to obtain foreign 
financing by foreign financial services firms.  
Hypothesis 2.2. Large firms are more likely to have business relationships 
to foreign financial service firms in their business network than small firms. 
Business relationships with foreign partners 
Firms in transition economies have significant benefits from interfaces 
with foreign firms for technological learning, to speed their 
internationalization, and to detect market opportunities in foreign markets. 
However, the development of relationships with foreign clients and suppliers 
is likely to be dependent on the foreign partners' perception of the focal 
firms' credibility and capacity to meet their obligations. The major barriers 
for foreign firms' interests in establishing exchange relations with the focal 
firms include the lack of knowledge about the focal firms' trustworthiness, 
the inability to measure accurately the focal firms' performance, or the 
absolute lack of knowledge on the focal firms' existence. In fact, foreign 
firms will have an even higher difficulty of evaluating the focal firms' status 
and performance than other domestic firms do when the information 
available is less reliable. Therefore, large firms are more likely than small 
firms to have business relationships with foreign organizations.  
Large firms have a more developed and possibly more extensive pool 
of business relationships to both domestic and foreign firms that serve as 
referrals for legitimacy and corporate strategy (Human & Provan, 2000). 
These relationships highlight that they are trustworthy and capable. 
Furthermore, large firms are likely to seek foreign markets (clients) to place 
their products as a market diversification strategy. However, to access 
foreign markets focal firms need to have some knowledge of the market, 
which necessitates local collaboration. Jack and Anderson (2002), for 
example, found that various market exploiting opportunities are embedded 
in the local structure and cannot be recognized and explored without social 
embeddedness – that is, without relationships to locally-based agents. 
Business relationships to foreign clients and suppliers may be bridges for 
the detection of market opportunities in foreign markets. In sum, we 
suggest that large firms are more likely to have business relationships with 
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foreign clients because large firms have larger manufacturing capacities that 
may satisfy the clients needs, have more exposure to foreign contacts (e.g. 
participation in trade fairs, and other events), and are more reliable in 
terms of meeting and fulfilling contracts than smaller firms. Furthermore, as 
discussed above, the added reputation and credibility of large firms lowers 
transaction costs, which is particularly important in transition economies. 
Hypothesis 3.1. Large firms are more likely to have business relationships 
with foreign client firms in their business network than small firms.  
It is likely that managers' discretionary freedom in small firms to 
make decisions without significant control from external agents and 
institutions may increase the perceived risk of doing business with these 
small firms (Huang et al., 2003). Although this is likely to occur in any 
country and any economic system, it is likely to be more seriously 
considered in the face of ineffective institutions. Conversely, the external 
monitoring mechanisms adopted by large firms, particularly publicly-traded 
firms, reduce managers' discretionary decision making power (Huang et al., 
2003). The difference is more than trivial as it decreases the perception of 
risk associated with a focal firm, particularly in what concerns payments to 
suppliers, meeting deadlines, and use of the firm's funds. To conclude, it is 
likely that large firms may seek foreign supply partners to satisfy resource 
needs not being met in the home market. Furthermore, procuring inputs on 
a worldwide scale provides larger control over timing, quantities, and 
qualities and provides a cost arbitrage advantage.  
Hypothesis 3.2. Large firms are more likely to have business relationships 
to foreign supplier firms in their business network than small firms.  
Business relationships with the government 
The government is a major economic player in any economy and 
particularly in economies that are still in transition from a centrally planned 
economic system. The government or government agencies are major 
clients, suppliers, and investors in the majority of the industries (Henisz, 
2001). As a large client, the government is likely to have strict criteria to 
ascertain from which firms it should procure goods and services. In fact, in 
many countries, governmental agencies specify the norms and 
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requirements that suppliers need to fulfill to qualify (e.g. ISO 9000 and 
14000). The government also procures in large quantities and seeks firms 
with higher stability and reputation. Finally, the government often pays its 
purchases after several months requiring firms to have the financial 
capacity to carry accounts. Therefore, we suggest that the government is 
more likely to procure from large established firms and, hence, large firms 
are more likely to have business ties to governmental agencies for supply 
purposes. 
Hypothesis 4.1. Large firms are more likely to have business relationships 
to the government and governmental agencies in their business network 
than are small firms  
Governments invest in firms for a variety of reasons, some of which 
strategic, others political, and yet others for social motives. For example, 
the government may be a partner or an investor in industries that are 
considered to be of strategic interest for the country but that require too 
large of an investment to trigger private interest (e.g., railroads, military 
equipment and defense, and energy). Other times, the government invests 
in firms to prevent bankruptcy and to avoid the political and social distress 
that follows a large loss of jobs. In addition, the government or affiliated 
agencies often invest in large development projects that require the pooling 
of private and public finances (e.g., large dams, highways) and may do so 
by acquiring an equity stake in an incumbent firm. Therefore, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that the government as an investor is keener on 
investing in firms with an established reputation, that are larger and more 
able to offer warranties. The informational market imperfections in 
transition economies make this preference more salient. 
Hypothesis 4.2. Large firms are more likely to have business relationships 
to the government and governmental agencies as investors in their business 
network than are small firms 
. 
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DATA AND METHODS 
Sample 
The data used in this study was drawn from a survey conducted by 
the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD). The survey and data are publicly available in the 
series Business Enterprise Environment Survey1 (BEEPS survey). The survey 
data was collected through phone interviews to top managers (e.g. CEO, 
President, Director, Manager, Owner, Proprietor) of firms from twenty-six 
transition economies during 1999-2000. We excluded the surveys with 
missing data in the variables of interest, state-owned firms, cooperatives, 
and non-profit organizations. We also excluded firms founded prior to 1985 
because the majority of the firms in the dataset were younger than ten 
years and the remaining were predominantly state-owned. Our final sample 
was composed of 3,048 firms. The countries included in the dataset are: 
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Rep. Serpska, Romania, Russia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.  
Measures  
Dependent variables. The dependent variables reflect the 
composition of a firm's network of business relationships and specifically the 
existence of business relationships with a certain economic agent. We coded 
into dummy variables each of the following nine business relationships that 
may exist in a firm's network: relationships with foreign firms as clients 
(FOREIGCL), foreign firms as suppliers (FOREIGSUP), foreign firms as 
equity owners or shareholders (FOREIGPT), government and/or 
governmental agencies as client (GOVERCL), government and/or 
governmental agencies as equity owners or shareholders (GOVERPT), 
national financial service firms (banks) as investors (FINNABA), and foreign 
financial service firms as investors (FINFORBA). The focal firm's informal 
relationships (FININFOR) reflect whether the firm relies on family, friends, 
and other traditional informal sources (e.g., money lender, supplier credit) 
                                                 
1 Survey and dataset accessible at http://econ.worldbank.org. 
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for resources. Given the emphasis of prior literature on family and friends 
as the main informal resource suppliers, we identified the relationships with 
families and friends (FINFAMIL) as a sub-case of informal relationships.  
Independent and control variables. Firm size (Size) was 
measured by the fixed assets as a categorical variable ranging from 1 (fixed 
assets less than $250,000) to 10 (fixed assets greater than $500 million). 
We achieved similar regression results when using the sales volume and the 
number of employees as alternative measurements of firms' size. The 
correlation between firms size measured by fixed assets and measured by 
sales was .7 and statistically significant. 
Prior research has indicated that the likelihood of forming business 
relationships with certain agents may be associated with the firm's age, 
industry background, physical location, legal form, and public status. 
Therefore, we included several control variables in our logistic regression 
models to account for these alternative explanations. Firms' age has been 
conceptually argued to influence the composition of their network (e.g., Hite 
& Hesterly, 2001; Huang et al., 2003). For example, older firms may have 
more experience and resources to build their business relationships with 
various market players. Firms' age was constructed as the difference 
between the year of founding and 2000. Age in our sample varies from one 
to fifteen (i.e., founded in 1985 or later).  
The firms' industry may also have an effect on its network 
composition. For example, the differences in market characteristics may 
lead to variations in opportunities to form partnerships. The control for 
industry2 is set as dummy variable that equals 1 for service firms and 0 for 
manufacturing firms. Participation in trade associations (Trade association) 
is a dummy variable that captures whether the firm is member of a trade 
association. Participation in trade associations may enhance firms' visibility, 
reputation, legitimacy, endorsement, and extension of their information 
channels facilitating the formation of business relationships. We also control 
for firms' legal form (Legal form) such as single proprietorship, partnership, 
                                                 
2 Although a larger differentiation of industries would be desirable this is not permitted 
given the data used. 
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and corporation. In addition, we included two controls for firm location: the 
country of the firms (26 dummies) and the size of the city where they are 
located (Large city). We classify the city as large if it has more than 
250.000 citizens or if it is the country's capital. Finally, we coded the firms 
origin in three dummy variables: private firms (equals 1 if the firm is 
private since establishment), joint ventures (JV) (equals 1 if the firm was 
established as a joint venture between domestic and foreign partners), and 
privatized firms (equals 1 if the firm resulted from the privatization of a 
previously state-owned firm).  
 
RESULTS 
In Tables 1 and 2, we provide descriptive statistics and correlations 
for all variables. Although there are a number of significant correlations, 
none is high enough to raise multicollinearity concerns (Hair et al., 1995). 
We used variance inflation factors (VIF) to test for multicollinearity and 
none of the VIF scores approached the commonly accepted threshold of 10 
to indicate multicollinearity. One of the noteworthy correlations in Table 2 is 
between firm size and age which is very low (0.14) and significant. In prior 
studies these variables have been confounded, which may explain the 
difficulties in clearly distinguishing the independent effects of size and age. 
The unexpected low correlation between firm size and age is an advantage 
in our sample because we avoid possible confounding effects of these two 
variables on our dependent variables, as may occur whenever there is a 
high correlation between firms' size and age. However, the low correlation 
may also reflect limitations of our sample. Firm age ranges from one to 
fifteen years old, which, under most industry conditions, implies relatively 
young firms. The mean age of the firms in our sample is 6.95 years, 33 
percent are at most five years old and 91 percent are at most ten years old. 
Firms at this stage may still suffer from a liability of newness or of 
adolescence.  
[ Insert Table 1 & 2 here ] 
Results of the logistic regression models used to test the hypotheses 
are presented in Table 3. The dependent variables capture whether the focal 
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firms have a certain type of business relationship (client, supplier, and 
investor) with a certain agent (e.g., family/friends, national financial firms, 
government, foreign financial firms). To test these hypotheses we ran nine 
logistic regressions and examined the probability of occurrence of a certain 
business relationship. With the significance level at 99.9%, our logistic 
regression models were significant as indicated by the models' Chi-square 
values.  
[ Insert Table 3 here ] 
Hypothesis 1 suggested that large firms were more likely to have 
formal relationships, and, conversely, that small firms were more likely to 
rely on informal relationships. Models 1 and 2 tested this hypothesis. In 
Model 2, firm size was significantly related to the formation of informal 
relationships (β=-0.15, p< .01). However, the coefficient estimated in 
Model 1 is not statistically significant. As firms' size increases, it seems that 
they are less likely to maintain informal business relationships to family and 
friends. Therefore, hypothesis 1 received only partial support.  
Hypothesis 2 advanced that, in contrast to small firms, large firms 
were more likely to have relationships with both national financial firms 
(Hypothesis 2.1) and foreign financial firms (Hypothesis 2.2). In fact, we 
found firm size to be significantly related to the likelihood of having 
business relationships with local financial firms in Model 3 (β=0.13, p< 
.001) and with foreign financial firms (banks) in Model 4 (β=0.35, p< .001). 
Therefore, both Hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2 were supported. 
Model 5 and Model 6 tested the third set of hypotheses. Both 
coefficients of firms' size were positive and significant (β=0.27, p<0.001 in 
Model 5; β=0.31, p< .001 in Model 6). In addition, we used Model 7 to 
examine whether larger firms tended to have foreign firms as equity 
investors. The coefficient is positive and statistically significant (β=0.29, 
p<.001). Hence, Hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2 were supported confirming that 
large firms are more likely to have foreign firms in their business networks 
as clients (Hypothesis 3.1) and as suppliers (Hypothesis 3.2).  
Hypotheses 4.1 and 4.2 proposed that firms' size is positively associated 
with their involvement with the government. Both statements found strong 
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support (β=0.07, p<0.01 in Model 8; and β=0.14, p< .01 in Model 9). 
Therefore, Hypotheses 4.1 and 4.2 were also supported.  
Additional results 
Firms' legal form 
We extended our analysis to firms' legal form. We observed that firms 
originated as joint ventures with foreign firms were more likely to be 
involved with foreign firms as suppliers, clients, and/or investors (see 
models 4, 5, and 6 in Table 3). Joint ventures were also more likely to obtain 
financial resource from foreign financial institutions than either private firms 
or privatized state-owned firms. This result seems to indicate that business 
relationships are cumulative and entail a positive spillover. However, the 
small number of joint ventures in the sample requires caution in potential 
extrapolations. In addition, private firms are more likely to have a higher 
proportion of informal business relationships. A simple explanation is that 
these firms may have a liability of newness and that it is likely to be more 
difficult for new firms to establish formal ties due to a lack of reputation and 
legitimacy, as discussed previously. It may also be specific to our data 
where new firms predominate. Furthermore, firms that result from 
privatization of formerly state-owned enterprises have more relationships 
with national financial service firms. A possible explanation is that privatized 
firms have to rely more on financial institutions for resources because they 
have lost, at least partially, the financial backing of the government. 
Countries environmental idiosyncrasies  
To examine whether the relationships verified on the composition of 
business networks in transition economies are universal or particular to all 
countries, we conduct a sub-group analysis for selected countries. To select 
these countries, we utilized the CIA World Factbook (www.cia.gov) to 
determine the population and GDP per capita (at purchasing power parity: 
PPP). We also looked at the countries that either joined or which are most 
likely to join the European Union3. We restricted the analyses to the 
                                                 
3 The European Union candidate countries are: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Turkey. 
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following countries: Bulgaria (GDPpc PPP4: $6.600, population: 7.621), 
Czech Republic (GDPpc PPP: $15.300, population: 10.257), Poland (GDPpc 
PPP: $9.500, population: 38.625), Hungary (GDPpc PPP: $13.300, 
population: 10.075), Turkey (GDPpc PPP: $7.000, population: 67.309), 
Ukraine (GDPpc PPP: $4.200, population: 48.396), and Russia (GDPpc PPP: 
$8.800, population: 144.978). 
The results in Table 4 below show that, in these countries, firms' 
business relationships with the government still play a major role beyond a 
level we expect in more institutionally developed countries. In Ukraine, 
about 65 percent, and in Poland and Russia, about 55 percent of firms have 
supply ties with the government. The extremely high participation of the 
government as a client may reflect reminiscences of a centrally planned 
economy. However, given that our sample is limited to privately-held firms 
the government appears as a small investor. Perhaps, even though the 
government may be decreasing its economic participation in these 
countries, the reconfiguration of firms' business network is taking time to 
form and that these firms are still highly dependent on procurement ties 
with governmental agencies.  
[ Insert Table 4 here ] 
In general, firms across all these seven countries carry a substantial 
portion of informal ties such as the ties to family and friends. This finding is 
consistent with Roth and Kostova's (2001) study. Yet, a closer observation 
revealed that the importance of informal relationships differs pronouncedly 
across countries. For example, approximately 45% of the informal 
relationships of Bulgarian firms are composed of families and friends while 
these account for 10% for Polish firms. Therefore, although informal 
relationships play an important role in the networks of firms in transition 
economies, other macro-level factors (e.g., national culture, maturity of 
capital market) may still lead to different emphasis on firms' reliance on 
personal ties for business relationships.  
                                                 
4 GDP per capita PPP – Gross Domestic Product per capita at purchasing power parity. 
These values refer to the year 2002 or latest available. 
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Business relationships to foreign investors are particularly frequent in 
Hungary and Czech Republic. However, foreign firms are more important as 
clients and suppliers than as investors across our sample. This picture may 
be changing as a growing number of foreign firms (namely from Western 
Europe) relocate the more labor-intensive activities to transition economies. 
The prospect that more of these countries may join the European Union is 
likely to bring even more economic, political, and social stability to the 
region. Financing from foreign banks plays, still, a limited role in the pool of 
financing sources, but we may expect their importance to increase as 
political and economic risk decrease and larger multinationals set operations 
in these countries.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this study we examined the composition of the network of 
business relationships of firms of different sizes and from transition 
economies. The results indicate that in contrast to smaller firms, larger 
firms are more like to have formal business relationships, and relationships 
with local and foreign financial institutions, government/government 
agencies, and foreign firms. This study contributes to a better 
understanding of small and large firms' business network. Furthermore, it 
contributes not only to the social network literature by investigating 
empirically the composition of firms' business networks in terms of the type 
and the role of the network members, but also to the international business 
literature by exploring firms' business relationships in the context of 
transition economies. We tested some hypotheses that have been 
conceptualized, although not empirically tested, in prior research. 
While business networks have been studied in developed countries, 
considerably less attention has been devoted to firms' networks in transition 
countries. The institutional, political, and economic context in transition 
economies may not allow generalizations to developed countries. However, 
the expected economic development of the transition economies, particularly 
those in Eastern Europe, and the fact that at least some of these countries 
have joined the European Union makes them an interesting object of study. 
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In fact, this setting is important as it allows us to observe countries whose 
business environments are substantially different from that of the US or 
Western European countries. New insights, with the potential for theory 
generation, may also emerge from analyzing business networks in countries 
that are shifting from a centrally planned economic system to a market-
based economic system. 
Our study further sheds some insights into how the configuration of 
firms' business networks may affect transition economies' ability to be 
innovative. For example, if the national firms have business relationships 
predominantly to other national firms, this may hinder their ability to 
introduce major modifications in the technological path of the country 
(Kogut, 1991). Conversely, if national firms have ties that span the national 
boundaries it is likely they may engage in a mix of exploitation and 
exploration of various technological trajectories (Kogut, 1991; March, 
1991). For example, small firms are likely to be constrained to local 
searches (Lipparini & Sobrero, 1994), because their ties tend to be local and 
less diverse. Conversely, large firms are more likely to have broader ties 
and be able to explore both locally and internationally. Large firms also 
have larger resources to commit to those searches. Nevertheless, the 
impact of firms' business ties for innovation in transition economies 
warrants additional research. 
How do firms construct, re-construct, and adjust their network of 
business relationships throughout their life cycles? Hite and Hesterly (2001) 
suggested that firms' networks evolve to accommodate emerging resource 
needs and changes in external pressures. While small and new firms may 
establish relationships with the purpose of overcoming a lack of legitimacy 
and reputation, in later stages, the main purpose of business relationships 
may be to satisfy resource needs or different types of legitimacy (e.g. 
legitimacy to operate in foreign markets, to partner with the Government). 
However, this reasoning does not address explicitly the institutional 
environment factors. The understanding of firms' business networks requires 
that we examine the resource dependencies that lead to certain 
compositions of firms' business networks in each stage of firms evolution 
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(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), the environmental institutional effects (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983), and the firms' strategies (Hite & Hesterly, 2001). 
Furthermore, given that size is a major dimension along which firms evolve, 
this analysis has a potential for extension in other dimensions that also 
characterize the evolution of firms such as age, and product or market 
portfolio.  
In addition to empirical evidence for the hypotheses advanced, some of 
our other results are of noticeable interest. The low correlation between age 
and size is interesting and may reflect the profound institutional, economic, 
and political shifts taking place in transition economies. Thus, this low 
correlation may be a natural outcome when studying firms from transition 
economies rather than an artifact of the data used. In addition, given that 
access to economic agents is important in establishing business 
relationships, we included the size of the city in which the firm is located. 
The results indicate that the larger the city the more likely the firm has 
relationships to a variety of agents. Firms in larger cities have easier access 
to the government, to foreign agents and to local financial institutions. Thus 
is, larger cities seem to be more munificent (Wan & Hoskisson, 2003) and 
firms in these cities resort to informal ties less often (the coefficients for 
FINFAMIL and FININFOR are negative and significant in models 1 and 2 in 
Table 3) than firms in smaller cities.  
We further note that membership in trade associations seems to be 
particularly relevant for forming ties with foreign firms regardless of the 
function of the tie. This is consistent with the idea that membership in trade 
associations increases the firms' visibility in the international markets and 
may serve as a reputation referral decreasing the perceived transaction 
costs incurred by foreign firms. Interestingly, privatized firms seem to suffer 
more from higher hazards in establishing business relationships than private 
firms, which may be due to the recency of the privatization projects and to 
the often quite radical modernization and restructuring that firms undergo 
post-privatization. It is possible that the restructuring is increasing the 
perceived risks of carrying exchanges with these firms.  
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Finally, we suggest that country idiosyncratic variables may be strong 
determinants of the composition of firms' network. National culture, societal 
norms, and values may influence the types of ties established. For instance, 
Hungary and Poland are predominantly Catholic, whereas the central Asian 
countries in the sample are predominantly Muslim, which may have an 
impact on financing. Governmental influences, regulatory and legal policies, 
and social characteristics are other possible contextual factors. For example, 
it may be that inter-firm trust and stable business relationships are major 
and effective governance mechanisms against risks of opportunistic 
behaviors (Williamson, 1985; Dyer & Singh, 1998). In fact, trust among 
partner firms has been noted as an essential condition for efficient economic 
transactions. Trust may even be a substitute to overcome institutional 
failures in transition countries. Future research may assess what is the role 
of trust for the formation of business relationships in transition economies 
and how the profound economic transformations affect the stability of trust-
based exchanges. In this regard, it is possible that the informal business 
relationships tend to be more reliant on inter-firm trust than on formal and 
contractual relationships.  
Limitations and other research avenues. This study is based on a 
cross-sectional analysis. The data only permits us to characterize the 
situation in a single point in time. In addition, we have access to past data 
simply based on top managers' recall. Scholars have questioned the reliance 
on executives' recall of previous company issues. For instance, Golden 
(1992) suggested that retrospective reports of important organizational 
phenomena may be inaccurate and somewhat misleading. However, 
retrospective reports have been commonly used in strategic management 
and organization theory research. For example, Miller, Cardinal, and Glick 
(1997) responded to Golden's critique by showing that retrospective 
reporting is a viable research methodology if the measures used are 
adequately reliable and valid. Notwithstanding, further insights may be 
achieved by utilizing longitudinal data and data from diverse sources rather 
than from a single source. Future research may use data dedicated to 
support this line of research rather than publicly available data. However, 
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the cost of surveying and interviewing firms in each of these countries is 
likely to be a prohibitive constraint.  
We were primarily interested in the composition of the network of 
business relationships and therefore, we did not delve substantially into 
contextual factors (e.g., cultural variations, extensiveness of corruption, 
demography, taxation). However, contextual factors are important to 
understand how and why certain network compositions may emerge and 
persist. Further, it is probable that industry characteristics moderate some 
of the relationships we advanced because different industries have different 
capital and technological intensities, different needs for inter-firm 
collaboration, different practices in what relates to procurement relations 
and venture capital, and so forth. Our restriction of industry controls to 
service versus manufacturing was imposed by the data. However, future 
research may provide additional insights into industry variations.  
While we restricted our analyses to the ego network and the types of 
partners that compose firms' business network, future research may 
examine the specific functional composition of the network (e.g., ties for 
R&D, specific supply components, distribution channels). An immediate 
question is; how do firms' business networks influence R&D, innovation 
outcomes, specialization, and business scope in transition economies?   
Finally, future research may examine whether the formation of 
business relationships is cumulative. If prior affiliations provide 
endorsement and increase the likelihood that the focal firms will be able to 
develop subsequent business relationships with other organizations (Baum 
& Singh, 1994), we could expect that prior ties to the government would 
provide that legitimacy. For example, business relationships with the 
government or with foreign firms could be a signal of quality, managerial 
ability, stability, honor payments and agreements. However, that does not 
seem to be the case in our sample where privatized firms which should 
benefit from prior ties to the government, do not seem to hold any 
advantage. Therefore, future research may advance our understanding on 
the extent to which the firms' current network of business relationships is a 
determinant of their future network composition.  
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To conclude, the study of the composition of firms' business network 
contributes to our understanding of the organization of economic exchanges 
and the idiosyncrasies of firms' interactions in transition economies. While 
firms in transition economies are predictably similar because of a somewhat 
common recent history and institutional background, they are also 
predictably dissimilar from Western firms. Understanding firms' business 
network can help determine how firms overcome the uncertainties and 
limitations imposed by severe institutional and economic transformations 
occurring in transition economies. The ability to establish a variety of ties 
determines these firms' ability to obtain the resources needed to survive 
and grow during and post the transition period. The inter-country 
comparison showed substantial differences evidencing different progress in 
the transition process. However, overall, informal relationships and ties to 
the government are still very significant. Larger firms seem to be more 
capable of establishing business relationships, than smaller firms, with both 
domestic and foreign firms, which raises some concerns on the national 
ability to develop a stable industry and to innovate.  
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TABLE 1. Means and Standard Deviations 
 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev Min Max 
FOREIGPT 2964 0.14 0.34 0 1 
FOREISUP 2963 0.33 0.47 0 1 
FOREIGCL 2907 0.26 0.44 0 1 
GOVERPT 2964 0.06 0.24 0 1 
GOVERCL 2821 0.46 0.50 0 1 
FINFAMIL 2838 0.19 0.39 0 1 
FININFOR 2838 0.08 0.28 0 1 
FINNABA 2838 0.21 0.41 0 1 
FINFORBA 2838 0.03 0.16 0 1 
Size 2968 1.97 1.66 1 10 
Age 2968 6.95 2.57 1 15 
Industry 2967 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Country 2968 14.77 7.48 1 26 
Large city 2968 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Private firm 2968 0.69 0.46 0 1 
Privatized firm 2968 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Joint venture 2968 0.03 0.18 0 1 
Legal form 2967 2.68 1.53 1 6 
Trade association 2968 0.22 0.41 0 1 
 
 
 TABLE 2. Correlations Matrix 
 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1 FOREIGPT 1.00                   
2 FOREISUP 0.30* 1.00                  
3 FOREIGCL 0.24* 0.43* 1.00                 
4 GOVERPT 0.07* 0.05* 0.11* 1.00                
5 GOVERCL -0.00 0.11* 0.16* 0.12* 1.00               
6 FINFAMIL -0.15* -0.13* -0.13* -0.10* -0.13* 1.00              
7 FININFOR -0.03 -0.00 0.01 -0.04* 0.01 0.20* 1.00             
8 FINNABA 0.02 0.12* 0.11* 0.02 0.05* 0.01 0.05* 1.00            
9 FINFORBA 0.23* 0.14* 0.12* 0.07* 0.01 -0.05* 0.00 0.05* 1.00           
10 Size 0.21* 0.28* 0.28* 0.16* 0.12* -0.14* -0.01 0.16* 0.18* 1.00          
11 Age 0.03 0.11* 0.14* 0.01 0.12* -0.08* -0.01 0.16* 0.02 0.14* 1.00         
12 Industry 0.04* -0.03 -0.09* -0.10* -0.13* 0.07* 0.01 -0.00 0.02 -0.13* -0.03 1.00        
13 Country -0.04* -0.09* 0.01 0.06* 0.16* -0.09* -0.03 0.08* -0.03 0.08* 0.06* -0.10* 1.00       
14 Large City 0.18* 0.14* 0.03 -0.00 0.01 -0.06* -0.02 -0.06* 0.04* 0.01 -0.00 0.12* -0.02 1.00      
15 Private Firm -0.08* -0.06* -0.08* -0.29* -0.13* 0.21* 0.06* -0.03 -0.04* -0.19* -0.00 0.25* -0.11* 0.12* 1.00     
16 Privatized Firm -0.06* 0.01 0.05* 0.28* 0.13* -0.19* -0.06* 0.05* 0.01 0.19* 0.01 -0.27* 0.11* -0.16* -0.93* 1.00    
17 Joint Venture 0.37* 0.15* 0.07* 0.04* 0.02 -0.06* -0.01 -0.04* 0.08* 0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.10* -0.27* -0.11* 1.00   
18 Legal Form 0.13* 0.11* 0.13* 0.28* 0.16* -0.19* -0.08* 0.08* 0.06* 0.23* 0.01 -0.17* 0.14* -0.01 -0.40* 0.39* 0.05* 1.00  
19 Trade association 0.12* 0.19* 0.21* 0.04* 0.07* -0.08* -0.02 0.15* 0.08* 0.27* 0.16* -0.02 0.05* 0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.04* 0.12* 1.00 
 
Note: *p<0.05 
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TABLE 3. Logistic Regression Models 
 
FININFOR 
(Model 1) 
FINFAMIL 
(Model 2) 
FINNABA 
(Model 3) 
FINFORBA 
(Model 4) 
FOREIGCL 
(Model 5) 
FOREISUP 
(Model 6) 
FOREIGPT 
(Model 7) 
GOVERCL 
(Model 8) 
GOVERPT 
(Model 9) 
Intercept -0.18 -0.94† -3.77*** -3.49*** -1.89*** -0.34 -0.19 -1.53*** -4.96*** 
Firm size 0.00 -0.15** 0.13*** 0.35*** 0.27*** 0.31*** 0.29*** 0.07** 0.14** 
Firm age -0.04* -0.07** 0.12*** -0.01 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.00 0.08*** 0.02 
Industry 0.06 0.06 0.17† 0.32 -0.33*** -0.10 0.26* -0.35*** -0.17 
Country 0.00 -0.02* 0.02** -0.04* -0.01 -0.04*** -0.03** 0.03*** 0.01 
Large city -0.30*** -0.46*** -0.36*** 0.33 0.14 0.61*** 0.95*** 0.15† 0.29† 
Private firm 0.30 1.44** 0.75* -1.21** -0.65** -1.60*** -3.55*** -0.18 -1.80*** 
Privatized firm -0.14 0.24 0.73* -1.22** -0.77** -1.72*** -4.06*** 0.09 0.13 
Legal form -0.07* -0.20*** 0.07* 0.09 0.12*** 0.10** 0.26*** 0.13*** 0.63*** 
Trade association -0.01 -0.20 0.53*** 0.42† 0.66*** 0.55*** 0.35* 0.11 -0.05 
Model Chi-square 59.46*** 260.19*** 175.03*** 80.76*** 322.20*** 438.69*** 491.90*** 208.34*** 356.78*** 
N 2836 2836 2836 2836 2905 2961 2962 2819 2963 
Note:  Cell entries are unstandardized coefficients. 
                      †  p<.10;  * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<0.001 
FININFOR- informal relationships, FINFAMIL - relationships with family members and friends, FINNABA - financing by national 
bank, FOREIGCL - foreign client, FOREISUP - foreign supplier, FOREIGGPT - foreign investor/partner, GOVERCL - government as 
client, GOVERPT - government as investor/partner. 
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TABLE 4. Comparison of Network Composition in Selected Countries 
 
% 
Bulgari
a 
Czech 
Republic Poland Russia Turkey 
Hungar
y Ukraine 
FOREIGPT 10.22 21.24 18.52 6.51 9.23 23.48 12.96 
FOREIGSUP 24.14 27.43 29.63 15.75 26.15 30.43 27.31 
FOREIGCL 21.84 28.57 35.00 9.39 29.69 21.62 23.11 
GOVERPT 9.09 0.00 4.50 9.16 0.00 5.22 5.56 
GOVERCL 32.47 44.86 54.49 54.45 30.16 33.64 65.00 
FINFAMIL 44.58 29.00 7.60 15.42 30.77 21.93 18.98 
FININFOR 14.46 26.00 11.39 7.05 3.08 4.39 8.80 
FINNABA 22.89 12.00 36.08 20.26 43.08 14.04 19.44 
FINFORBA 2.40 9.00 3.80 1.32 3.08 2.63 1.39 
Note: the values indicate the % of firms' business relationships. These values do 
not add to 100% since each firm may carry simultaneously several types of ties and 
to multiple agents.   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
